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Use of public resources for private economic gain is a longstanding, contested 
political issue. Public resources generate benefits beyond commodity uses, including recreation, 
environmental and ecological conservation and preservation, and existence and 
aesthetic values. We analyze this problem using a dynamic resource use game. Low use 
fees let commodity users capture more of the marginal benefit from private use. This increases 
the incentive to comply with government regulations. Optimal contracts therefore 
include public use fees that are lower than private rates. The optimal policy also includes 
random monitoring to prevent strategic learning and cheating on the use agreements and 
to avoid wasteful efforts to disguise noncompliant behavior. An optimal policy also includes 
a penalty for cheating beyond terminating the use contract. This penalty must be 
large enough that the commodity user who would gain the most from noncompliance experiences 
a negative expected net return. 
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1. Introduction 
Fishing without a license; poaching big game; hiking and off-road vehicle use in fragile 
or protected areas; taking petrified wood, fossils, or Native American artifacts from pub-
lic lands; cutting and hauling firewood in unapproved areas; and excess forage consump-
tion by privately owned livestock are examples of a common resource management prob-
lem. Each of these activities reduces the quality of a public resource for other users. The 
economic problem is that individual users face incentives that are not socially optimal. To 
help finance the cost of protecting, improving, and policing public resources, individuals 
are charged fees to exploit public resources. 
This paper uses livestock (privately owned cattle, sheep, and horses) grazing on fed-
eral lands to illustrate the nature of and solutions to this public resource use problem. 
Grazing and other commercial uses of federal land have been hotly contested for more 
than a century. For example, livestock graze on 262 million acres of federal land, 167 
million acres administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and 95 million 
acres administered by the United States Forest Service (USFS) land (USDI, 2003; USDA, 
2003) – a total land area larger than the Eastern seaboard plus Vermont, Pennsylvania 
and West Virginia. Roughly 28,000 livestock producers hold contracts to graze animals 
on federal lands, roughly 3% of all livestock producers in the United States, and 22% of 
the livestock producers in the eleven Western contiguous States (USDI-BLM, USDA-
USFS, 1995). Fishing, hunting guide and outfitting operations, mining, timber harvesting, 
and petroleum and natural gas exploration, development, and extraction present similar 
management challenges and are other extensive uses of public resources.    2 
 
One focus of the debate over the private use of public resources is the argument that 
commodity users are heavily subsidized. Figure 1 illustrates the discrepancy between 
public and private grazing fees in the eleven contiguous western states in constant 2009 
dollars, using the implicit price deflator for gross domestic product to adjust for inflation. 
Environmentalists, and some economists, have argued that higher use fees are linked 
to the quality of the environment associated with public resources. For grazing policy, 
this view is best articulated by President Clinton’s Council of Economic Advisors: 
“The controversy over rangeland reform shows the importance of integrat-
ing pricing with regulation to use the Nation’s resources more efficiently 
and strike a better balance between economic and environmental objec-
tives. 
A central point of contention involves the fees that the federal Gov-
ernment charges ranchers to graze animals on federal land. These fees 
should reflect both the value of the forage used by an additional animal 
and the external environmental costs of grazing an additional animal ... 
Charging ranchers the marginal value of forage ... encourages efficient use 
of the range. By preventing overgrazing, it protects the condition of the 
range for future uses. It also promotes long-run efficiency in the industry 
... 
Promoting efficiency thus means both increasing grazing fees and en-
suring that federal grazing fees change from year to year in accordance 
with changes in rent on private grazing land.” 
Economic Report of the President, 1994:182-83. 
This paper develops an economic model of the dynamic game between a public re-
source management agency and private commodity users who exploit the resource. In the 
first stage of this game, the agency chooses the administrative rules, including the ap-   3 
 
proved extraction rate, use fees, penalties for failing to comply with government regula-
tions, and a monitoring strategy. These are announced publicly and the government 
commits to this policy for all time. In all later stages, commodity users choose extraction 
rates, which may or may not be consistent with the government’s approved extraction 
rates, and the government pursues its monitoring and enforcement activities. All parties 
are risk neutral and form rational expectations, and the focus is on a subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium.  
2. A Model of Public Resource Management 
In this section, we develop a dynamic economic model of the incentives and conflicts be-
tween a regulatory agency and public resource commodity users. Let x(t) be the resource 
stock and let s(t) be the extraction rate. Let A denote the set of all use allotments and I the 
set of commodity user types. For each (,) ai A I    the net return from commodity use is 
(() , () ,,) vst xt ai and the net benefit to noncommercial use is  ( ( ), ( ), ) bst xt a. The com-
mercial net returns function is increasing in (x, s), the noncommercial benefit function is 
increasing in x and decreasing in s, and both are twice continuously differentiable and 
jointly concave in (x, s). Noncommercial use benefits do not depend on the characteristics 
of the commercial user. Individual characteristics that determine his or her type, i, are 
vector-valued. The agency cannot identify, choose, or affect any commercial user’s char-
acteristics or type. 
The equation of motion for the resource stock is  
  0 ( ) ( ( ), ) ( ), (0) ( ) , x t f x t a s t x x a fixed    (1) 
where the natural resource growth rate on allotment a,  (,) f xa, is twice continuously dif-   4 
 
ferentiable in x,  (0, ) 0 fa  ,  (0, ) 0 fax   , and 
22 (,) 0 0 fx a x x    . A unique 
maximum sustainable stock level,  ( ) 0
msy xa  , satisfying  (( ) , ) 0
msy fx aa x   exists for 
each aA   (Stoddard, Smith, and Box, p. 273; Libecap, p. 67). 
Suppose that commercial user iI   maximizes the unencumbered discounted present 
value of profits from commercial use on allotment aA  , 
  Private 0 0 {() ,() } (,, ) m a x (() ,() ,,)
rt
xt st Ja i x e v s t x t a i d t
     (2) 
subject to (1), where  0 r   is the real discount rate. From optimal control theory, the 
commercial user’s privately optimal wealth-maximizing use path satisfies (1) and the fol-











  . (3) 
The long-run steady state satisfies  Private Private 0 sx    , so that, 
  Private Private (,) ( (,) ,  ) sa i f xa i a
   (4) 
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   
 (5) 
The condition  ( , , ) / 0 0 Fxai x x      is sufficient for (5) to define a unique, globally 
stable, saddle point equilibrium. 
                                                 
1 Subscripts denote partial derivatives. Detailed derivations of all of the results presented in this paper are 
available from the authors upon request.    5 
 
Now consider the socially optimal decision rule on allotment a for the same commod-
ity user i. This decision rule includes both the commercial user’s flow of net returns from 
exploitation of the resource and the flow of noncommercial use benefits. 
The socially optimal resource use path is the solution to 
   Public 0 0 {() ,() } (,, ) m a x (() ,( ) ,,) (() ,( ) ,)
rt
st xt Ja i x e v s t x t a i b s t x t a d t
    , (6) 
subject to (1). Again from optimal control theory, this path satisfies (1) and the following 




() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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ss ss
rfvb vb v b fs
s
vb
    


  (7) 
The steady state now satisfies  Public Public (,) ( (,) ,) sa i f xa i a
   and the public manage-
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 ), ) 0. ar   
 (8) 
Analogous to the private equilibrium, the condition  (,,) 0 0 Gxai x x      is suffi-
cient for equation (8) to define a unique, globally stable, saddle point equilibrium.
2  
It follows from equations (5) and (8) that  Public Private (,) , . ai A I x x
     In turn, it 
                                                 
2 The first-order conditions for the private and the social optima also are sufficient for an optimal use path 
for the associated optimal control problems due to the concavity of v(,a,i), b(,a), and f(,a).    6 
 
follows from this result that,  0 0, x   the privately optimal harvest rate is higher than 
the socially optimal harvest rate. This is illustrated in Figure 2.  
The economic intuition for this result is the following. Because the harvest rate has a 
negative marginal value to noncommercial users, the value of the marginal product for s 
is lower for society than for the commercial user. Similarly, because the resource stock 
has a positive marginal value to noncommercial users, society’s value of the marginal 
product of x is higher than for the commercial user. Both effects work together, produc-
ing incentives for the commercial user to exploit the resource more intensively and har-
vest more stock than is socially optimal. 
3. Optimal Commercial Use Contracts for Public Resources 
Monitoring and enforcement by government agencies are costly activities. This is particu-
larly true under incomplete information about user types. Also, monitoring and enforce-
ment activities are not directly productive. They only have value to society insofar as 
they prevent unwanted or wasteful actions on the part of private resource users. As such, 
one goal of a rational government agency will be to minimize the cost of these activities.
3  
However, if an agency cannot monitor the use of public resources and effectively en-
force its regulations for that use, then there may be no penalty for pursuing purely private 
incentives. Therefore, given the conflict of interest between society and private resource 
                                                 
3 For example, this portion of BLM and USFS budgets is essentially independent of commercial use fees 
collected. Approximately 50% of fees go to state legislatures to be distributed to counties as “Payment in 
Lieu of Taxes,” 25-50% are earmarked for resource allotment improvement, and less than 25% return to the 
federal treasury. The General Accounting Office (1991) and the BLM estimate that the costs of monitoring 
grazing allotments greatly outweigh total grazing fees collected.     7 
 
users established above, this section of the paper considers the issues of design, monitor-
ing, and enforcement of commercial use contracts for public resources in the presence of 
imperfect monitoring and enforcement on the part of the government agency.  
Assume that the distribution of commercial user types,  : [0,1] I   , is known to the 
agency and time invariant. Each commercial user with a commercial use contract is con-
sidered by the agency to be a random draw from this distribution. The agency is unable to 
observe, select, or influence i on any allotment, and is unable to learn i regardless of the 
resources committed to seeking this information.
4  
Under rational expectations, given information only about the distribution of com-
mercial user types, the resource management agency will seek to maximize the expected 
discounted net benefits on each allotment, 
  0 0 {() ,() } (, ) m a x [(( ) ,( ) ,) (( ) ,( ) ,) ]
rt
Public st xt J a x e v s tx ta b s tx tad t
    , (9) 
subject to (1), where the expectation is taken over the distribution of commercial user 
types,
5 
  (() , () , ) (() , () ,,) ()
iI
v s tx ta v s tx ta i d i 

  . (10) 
                                                 
4 If I is a general sample space (e.g., a linear vector space), then the map from a structural form of a game 
to a reduced form based on types is not invertible. As a result, models leading to simplifications such as the 
revelation principle, which is often applied when i is a scalar, do not apply in this setting. 
5 This is a second best decision rule. In particular, if the agency could know or learn i, but not choose or 
influence the commodity user’s type, then it would first solve the decision problem in the previous section. 
If we then take expectations over types to determine the expected net benefit, it is clear that this will exceed 
the solution to (9) because the expected value of the pointwise maximum over I will always be at least as 
large as the maximum of the expected value over I. Moreover, if the agency could choose or influence the 
type, then it would be rational to select the optimal user for each allotment, which clearly dominates the 
average solution.    8 
 
Now the long-run steady state satisfies  Public Public () ( () ,) sa f xa a
   and the government 
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   
 (11) 
In this case, the condition  ( , ) 0 0 x Hx a x    is sufficient for equation (11) to deter-
mine unique, globally stable saddle point equilibrium. 
The commercial user’s choices for x(t) and s(t) are observed by the agency if and 
when the lease is monitored. To prevent the wasteful use of resources by a noncompliant 
commodity user to try to learn the timing and location of monitoring activities by the 
agency, the government’s monitoring strategy needs to be random and statistically inde-
pendent both across space (allotments) and across time. It needs to be independent across 
allotments so that a user cannot learn or predict the agency’s behavior on his allotment by 
observing monitoring activities on other allotments. It needs to be independent across 
time so that users cannot learn or predict the agency’s future behavior on the basis of 
their observations of past behavior. 
Beyond the necessity of spatial and temporal statistical independence, two properties 
of a well-designed monitoring and enforcement strategy are required. Both are driven by 
the conjoint goals of minimizing the cost of monitoring and enforcement, to identify and 
address noncompliant resource patterns, and to create an economic environment in which 
commodity users operate in an intertemporally consistent and predictable way, whether    9 
 
or not they are compliant with the commodity use regulations. We analyze these in re-
verse order. 
First, note that an independent, stationary Poisson process for monitoring each allot-
ment is a feasible monitoring rule that induces a stationary exponential distribution for 
the waiting time until the next monitoring event. The stationary exponential distribution 
is the unique stochastic process for waiting times without memory. If the real discount 
rate is constant, then a time autonomous resource extraction problem for a noncompliant 
commodity user is created. This is, in fact, the only way that the government agency can 
create a time autonomous decision problem for noncompliant commodity users. By the 
monotonicity of optimal control paths with a single state variable, this leads to a predict-
able, and eventually observable, noncompliant resource use path. 
Second, to permanently discourage noncompliant use of public resources, an optimal 
monitoring and enforcement policy will include a penalty function beyond terminating 
the commodity use agreement. Incentive compatibility, regardless of user type, requires 
this penalty to be large enough that the net present value of a compliant strategy exceeds 
the expected net present value of a noncompliant strategy.
6 The optimal penalty thus 
leads the commodity user who would gain the most from failing to comply with the use 
regulations to face an expected loss from noncompliance. 
The commodity user’s optimal decision regarding whether to cheat or comply with 
                                                 
6 This argument assumes that the government collects taxes, fees, and fines efficiently and is efficient in the 
provision of government goods and services and other activities – including monitoring and enforcement of 
regulatory rules. It also assumes that there are no political or other barriers or limits to the size of regulatory 
fines. However, see section 4 of this paper for a discussion of extensions to the model in this respect.    10 
 
the commodity use agreement in the first stage of play therefore becomes a subgame per-
fect Nash equilibrium strategy for all subsequent stages of the game. This permanently 
separates compliant and noncompliant users on all allotments. The government is then 
able to discover the entire extraction path at every monitoring date for each allotment. 
Therefore, to create a dynamic decision rule for a noncompliant commodity user that 
is time autonomous, let  ( ) a   denote the constant hazard rate for inspection times.
7 Then 
the rational expectation of the distribution of agency monitoring times is determined by 
the exponential probability density function, 
() (, ) ( )
at ta ae
 
  . Once the agency moni-
tors the allotment, it has complete information.
8 If the agency observes a stock that is be-
low or a harvest rate that is above the socially optimal level, then it concludes that the 
permit has been violated. In that case, the government will permanently terminate the 
lease and impose an additional penalty.
9 
We now turn to two issues. First, does the commercial use fee affect the harvest rates 
of compliant or noncompliant commercial users? Second, does the commercial use fee 
affect the compliance choice? 
                                                 
7 Independent and stochastic monitoring in a static setting when the regulator is unable to differentiate 
among agents is analyzed in Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979). In a dynamic setting, a constant hazard rate 
for monitoring times is equivalent to a stationary exponential distribution for the waiting time for the next 
monitoring date, regardless of the point in time in the commodity user’s resource use path. The exponential 
distribution is the unique continuous distribution without memory in this sense. 
8 Perfect detection of violations once an agent is monitored is a common theme in environmental regulation 
(e.g., Viscusi and Zeckhauser).  
9 Costly monitoring and limited budgets have frequently been argued to lead to optimal enforcement strate-
gies with random detection and penalties for violations (e.g., Becker 1968, Stigler 1970, and Polinsky and 
Shavell 1979).     11 
 
3.1 Commercial Users’ Decisions in a Regulated Environment 
The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934 set much of grazing policy still in effect today. Public 
grazing fees have always been lower than private fees (LaFrance and Watts). As figure 
one illustrates for public lands grazing over the past fifty years, real public grazing fees 
have been well below private grazing lease rates for several decades. This suggests that 
enough time has past for a compliant commercial user to have reached the long-run equi-
librium resource stock and harvest rate. Therefore, assume that  0 Public () () x ax a a .
   A  
The optimal compliant strategy is the sustained harvest rate  Public (,) ( ) 0 sti s a t
  . The 
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Wa i v s ax aa i p s aed t









where pg is the commercial use fee. 
On the other hand, the expected wealth of a noncompliant commercial user is par-
tially determined by the frequency and timing of monitoring.
10 The first time that the 
agency monitors an allotment, any cheating is detected. To mask their cheating, noncom-
pliant commercial users will pay  Public() g p sa
 . Consequently, commercial use fee pay-
ments act like a fixed cost to avoid the direct revelation of noncompliance. The expected 
                                                 
10 Becker (1968) and Stigler (1970) argue that individuals compare the expected benefits and costs of com-
pliance with laws and regulations. Viscusi and Zeckhauser (1979) extend this to the regulation of profit-
maximizing firms.     12 
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  




  . (13) 





(,) ((; ,) , (; ,) , ,) ()
ra t
NC g W ai e vstai xtai ai ps a d t


        . (14) 
Note, in particular, that the integrand in (14), with  () ra    as the constant real discount 
rate in a noncompliant optimal control problem, is time autonomous. This implies that the 
noncompliant commodity user’s optimal resource use path is monotone over time, so that 
a cyclical use path cannot complicate the agency’s monitoring problem. 
A noncompliant commercial user’s optimal control path satisfies (1) and 
 
[( ) ] ( )
.
xs x s x N C
NC
ss
ra f v v v f s
s
v
   
   (15) 
The numerator in (15) is positive with no monitoring. This is because the long-run equi-
librium resource stock in a privately optimal resource use path is lower than the long-run 
equilibrium resource stock in a socially optimal resource use path. Therefore,  ( ) 0 a    
increases the incentive for a noncompliant commercial user to exploit the resource more 
intensively. 
The long-run steady state equilibrium for a noncompliant commercial user satisfies 
                                                 
11 Sharon (1967) and Srinivisan (1973) argue that tax evaders hide actions to avoid suspicion by regulators.    13 
 
 (,) (,) , NC NC sa i f xa i a
   and 
 
( (,) , (,) , ,) ( (,) , (,) , ,)
[( ( , ) , )( ( ) ) ]0 .
x NC NC s NC NC
xN C
v s ai x ai ai v s ai x ai ai






It follows that the intertemporal harvest rate, the long-run equilibrium harvest rate, and 
the long-run equilibrium resource stock all are independent of the commodity use fee.
12 It 
also follows that  ( , )/ 0 NC xa i 
   . Thus, the long-run equilibrium stock is a decreasing 
function of the hazard rate for the first monitoring time, the intertemporal harvest rate is 
an increasing function of the hazard rate for the first monitoring time, and the commercial 
use fee plays no role in an optimal noncompliant commodity resource exploitation path. 
3.2 Commercial Use Fees versus Compliance 
At this point, we have established that the commercial use fee plays no role in the harvest 
rate choices of both compliant and noncompliant commercial users. It is equally clear that 
the wealth generated by either commercial use decision decreases with increased com-
mercial use fees. We now turn to the issue of how a change in the commercial use fee 
affects the decision to comply with commercial use regulations. We find that increasing 
the commercial use fee decreases the incentive to comply with the terms of a public re-
source commercial use contract. 
In the absence of a penalty function that is imposed when a noncompliant use path is 
first monitored, the commercial user’s decision whether to comply with contract provi-
                                                 
12 One implication is that higher commodity use fees do not necessarily reduce extraction rates or improve 
the environment.    14 
 
sions hinges on the expected net benefit from noncompliance,  NC C R WW  . The opti-
mal decision rule is to comply if  0 R   and to cheat if  0 R  . We analyze the qualitative 
properties of this decision rule by appealing to the dynamic envelope theorem and curva-
ture results of LaFrance and Barney (1991). This gives the following results, which we 















































































If  () 0 a   , it is clear that the optimal strategy is to cheat for any pg  0 since there is 
no penalty for doing so. It also follows from (17)–(23) that R is strictly increasing in the 























As a result, on each allotment, for any  () 0 a   , there is a unique commercial use fee 
(which may be negative),  ( ( ), , ) g p aa i  , such that  0 R  , and such that commercial user 
i is indifferent between complying and cheating. Differences across commercial users and 
allotments imply different ( ( ) a  , pg) pairs for which a given commercial user is indiffer-
ent between compliance and cheating on a given allotment. Therefore, in the absence of 
any penalty function imposed when cheating is first detected, some commercial user types 
will cheat and others will comply with the resource use regulations.  
It also follows from (17)–(23) that the monitoring rate must increase with the com-
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Thus, a constant compliance incentive and higher use fees require more monitoring 
expenditures. Moreover, monitoring costs are strictly convex in use fees. Conversely, low    16 
 
use fees are associated with lower monitoring costs, and the latter are not directly produc-
tive beyond their contribution to the prevention of undesirable resource use behavior.  
4. Optimal Penalties 
In this section, we analyze the properties of a penalty function that will permanently dis-
courage noncompliance with public resource use regulations. Therefore, suppose that if at 
date t the agency observes that commercial user i on allotment a has been cheating on the 
public resource extraction path, then the lease is permanently terminated and the penalty 
() Pa is imposed.
13 Throughout, we assume that the commodity user is self interested, has 
full information regarding the monitoring and enforcement strategy of the agency and the 
form of the penalty function, is risk neutral, and forms rational expectations. The gov-
ernment maximizes the expected discounted net present value of the sum of the commod-
ity user’s net returns, noncommodity user net benefits, and net government revenue.
14  
To specify the second best optimal use policy on any given allotment, first we iden-
                                                 
13 Section 43 CFR 4150.3 provides for penalties for willful unauthorized commercial use on federal lands 
to include the value of stock consumed – defined in 43 CFR 4150.3(c) as three times the private commer-
cial use lease rate in the state where the violation occurs, the value of damage to public resource and other 
Federal property, the cost of detecting, investigating, and enforcing violations, and the cost of impounding 
the trespassing livestock. 
14 Throughout this section, the assumption is that the government is efficient at tax, fee, and fine collection, 
and at providing government goods and services. This implies that the user fee is a cost to the commodity 
user and a benefit to society with equal and opposite weights in the social planner’s objective function, re-
gardless of the commodity user’s compliance decision. It also implies that a noncompliant user’s penalty 
imposed by the agency at the first monitoring time is a cost to the commodity user and a benefit to society, 
with equal and opposite weights in the planner’s problem. As a result, both of these terms drop out of the 
social planner’s objective functional.  
One could extend the model to include an increasing, convex cost of imposing and collecting the penalty P, 
say  ( ) ,( 0 ) 0 ,( 0 ) 1 ,( ) 0 0 PP P P cPc c cP P      , possibly with an upper limit due to political constraints, 
so that  max lim ( ) .
PP cP
  These extensions complicate the analysis and are the subject of ongoing work. 
In particular, if the upper limit 
max P  is binding, a positive rate of noncompliance can exist in equilibrium.    17 
 
tify the expected net benefits to commodity users, noncommodity users, and society. The 
expected wealth of a noncompliant commercial user is 
()
0 0
(,) () (() ,() ,,) () ()
t
at r r t
NC g Public Wa i a e e v x s a ip s a de P a d t

   





   . (28) 
The leading term in the outer integral is the probability density function for the first 
monitoring time. As noted above, this distribution is without memory and therefore leads 
to a time autonomous decision rule for the noncompliant commodity user, regardless of 
his or her type, if and only if it is generated by a stationary exponential distribution, i.e., 
() (,) () ,
at at ae
 
   for some constant  ( ) 0. a    The integral inside the braces is the 
discounted present value for the noncompliant commodity user for the period of time that 
he or she is not observed out of compliance with the terms of the resource use contract. 
The last term inside the braces is the present value of the additional penalty assessed on 
the noncompliant user at the first monitoring time. Integrating by parts in a manner simi-
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ra t
NC g Public Wa i e v s t x t a ip s a a P a d t

        
   (29) 
Note that, as in section 3.1 above, with the constant real discount rate equal to  () ra  , 
this objective functional is time autonomous. 
Our primary interest is in the marginal commodity user who has been in compliance 
for long enough to reach the second best socially optimal steady state, and who considers 
the net benefit of a noncompliant strategy from that point onward. The Hamilton-Jacoby-
Bellman equation for this infinite horizon time autonomous optimal control problem can    18 
 
be written in the form, 
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          
 (30) 
The first term in the square brackets on the right-and-side of this equation, which appears 
on the first line, is the current flow of net returns obtained from moving from the compli-
ant long-run equilibrium  Public Public () , () sa xa
  to the noncompliant extraction path be-
ginning at  Public (0, , ), ( ) NC sa i xa
  for user type i on allotment a. The second term in the 
square brackets, which appears on the second line, is the shadow price of the resource 
stock at time 0 and the compliant long-run equilibrium level  Public() x a
  times the negative 
net growth rate of the resource stock that results from the more intensive extraction rate 
of a noncompliant strategy. The last term on the right-hand side is the product of the 
(constant) hazard rate for the first monitoring time times the penalty for being caught in a 
noncompliant strategy. 
Recall from the previous section that the wealth of a compliant user at the long-run 
equilibrium solution is 
  Public Public Public
1
(,) ( () , () ,,) () 0 . Cg Wa i v s ax aa i p s a iI
r
         (31) 
The inequality on the right-hand side is a necessary condition for incentive compatibility 
when the agency cannot identify, choose, influence, or learn the commodity user’s type. 
This condition simply says that the discounted present value of the net benefit flow from    19 
 
compliant commodity use on any given allotment is positive for all possible commodity 












    (32) 
In other words, incentive compatibility requires that the commercial use fee must be less 
than the minimum all across user types of the average value product of the harvest rate. 
An optimal penalty function  ( ) Pa discourages any commercial user, regardless of his 
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              
. (33) 
This is an algebraic transformation of the compliance condition  0 NC C WW i I     in 
the previous section, extended here to include the penalty function. This places a lower 
bound on the product of the constant hazard rate for monitoring times the penalty that is 
imposed on a noncompliant user. In other words, a lower monitoring rate – which by (26) 
is associated with a lower user fee – requires a higher penalty for noncompliance in order 
to permanently discourage noncompliant resource exploitation by all commodity users. 
Intuitively, on each allotment the penalty for being caught and punished pursuing a 
noncompliant resource use program has to be large enough that the discounted present 
value of the expected net benefit from cheating is nonpositive for any user, regardless of    20 
 
type. This implies that almost all (that is, all except for a set of measure zero) commercial 
users on all allotments optimally choose a compliant strategy in a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. 
5. Conclusions 
Commercial use of public resources is a source of intense conflict and political debate. A 
primary source of this conflict is the diversity of interest groups competing for the bene-
fits generated by those resources. Property rights and use rights are not well defined and 
it is unlikely that this will change in the foreseeable future. There also is ample evidence 
that commercial users of public resources pay use fees that generically have the appear-
ance of large subsidies. We analyze this economic problem through a dynamic natural 
resource management game.  
Low use fees let commercial users capture more rents from commodity use of public 
resources. This increases the incentive to comply with mandated harvest rates and other 
regulations. Optimal contracts thus include use fees that are lower than what are typically 
described as competitive rental rates in a private market.  
Furthermore, an optimal contract includes random monitoring of the resource use 
path of the commodity user. Randomness and independence prevent strategic learning by 
noncompliant users. This avoids wasteful efforts to disguise their noncompliant behavior. 
An optimal public resource use policy also includes a penalty function for noncom-
pliance beyond permanently terminating the use contract. The penalty that is assessed for 
being caught and punished for noncompliant behavior must be large enough that the 
commercial user who would profit the most from cheating has a negative expected return    21 
 
from doing so. 
In closing, it is at least somewhat interesting to note that these attributes of an optimal 
public resource management program appear to reflect many aspects of the longstanding 
approach to public grazing policy on Federal lands. As figure 1 illustrates, Federal graz-
ing fees have remained low in real terms relative to private rental rates throughout the 
Western United States for the past 100 years. BLM and USFS range conservationists ran-
domly monitor the grazing activities of public grazing leaseholders in each grazing sea-
son. The incidence of major disputes on Federal grazing lands which resulted in penalties 
being assessed is extremely low – less than a handful of cases have occurred in the eleven 
Western states in the last 30 years. Finally, the penalties assessed in the most widely pub-
licized of these disputes were very large – in addition to permanently terminating the 
grazing lease, all capital improvements on the leased land were confiscated and the tres-
passing ranchers’ livestock were rounded up and sold at auction. This appears to repre-
sent at least an approximate and practical application of the principle of extracting any 
and all of the net benefits that these ranchers could have gained from pursuing noncom-
pliant resource extraction strategies. 
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Figure 1. Real Public and Private Grazing Fees.
2009 $ per Animal Unit Month
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Figure 2. Phase Diagram for Public and Private Optimal Grazing Paths.
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Figure 3. Long-Run Equilibrium Dynamic vmp(x).
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